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The calm after the storm? Foreign and security policy from Blair 
to Brown 
Richard G. Whitman 
Abstract 
This article examines the main aspects of the UK’s foreign and security policy across the 2005‐2010 
Parliament. It begins by discussing the highpoint of foreign policy during the period, and goes on to 
consider the evolution of the UK’s foreign policy doctrine, looking in particular at whether Brown 
established a world view that was distinctive from his predecessor. The analysis then turns to the key 
foreign policy actors in the period and in particular the extent to which changes of foreign secretary 
impacted on the UK’s foreign and security policy. The article assesses the foreign and security policy 
issues that predominated from after the 2005 General Election, through Brown’s anointment as Prime 
Minister in 2007 and until the 2010 General Election. The final part of the article considers the minimal 
role that foreign policy played in the 2010 General Election campaign. There was a considerable 
convergence of views between each of the three main political parties in their foreign policy platforms. 
Labour faced criticism for its resourcing of the war in Afghanistan, rather than objection to continuing 
engagement. The renewal of the Trident weapons system was one of the few substantive issues dividing 
the Conservatives and Labour from the Liberal Democrats. 
If discontent over foreign policy, and more particularly the decision to go to 
war in Iraq, was the leitmotif of the second half of Blair’s premiership, 
Brown’s administration was marked by the need to deal with the global 
financial crisis. Distinctions can be drawn between the respective foreign 
policy approaches of the Blair and Brown administrations. The differences 
were, however, those of style and emphasis, rather than substantive 
differences in the direction and objectives of the UK’s foreign policy. The 
period from the 2005 General Election until the 2010 election can be 
characterised as one in which New Labour attempted to ‘normalise’ foreign 
and security policy by reducing its salience as an area of widespread public 
political concern, but then found itself struggling to respond to an 
unprecedented challenge to the global political economy. 
The fire‐fighting response to the emerging global financial crisis 
became a predominant concern for Brown in the final two years of his 
premiership, overriding longer standing commitments to reform the 
governance of the political economy to distribute its benefits more widely and 
to more effectively tackle climate change. There is a curious coincidence in 
Blair‘s and Brown’s periods as Prime Minister in that both became the hostage 
of external events that they had initially sought to channel and direct. In both 
cases  ‐ the Iraq War and the global financial crisis  ‐ the two British Prime 
Ministers also sought to play a primary supporting role to that of the United 
States. Both Prime Ministers were strong trans‐Atlanticists, each seeking to act 
as advocate for the uses of U.S. power for purposes that they sought to shape 
and influence. 
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A New Labour foreign policy highpoint: the G8 Presidency 
The period immediately following election of May 2005 was 
characterised by a high degree of continuity in the key foreign and security 
challenges confronting the UK. This is to be expected as the UK’s broad 
foreign and security priorities had been established in the first two terms of 
the New Labour government and the strategic reorientation of external 
relations was not a platform on which the 2005 election was fought. 
Furthermore, as the timetable for the withdrawal of British troops from Iraq 
was as yet to be defined, Iraq remained a key focus of political and military 
resources, and its replacement by Afghanistan as the main theatre of 
operations for UK forces was yet to be initiated. 
The year of the General Election was also one in which the UK enjoyed 
a high international profile. The UK chaired the G8 and held the Presidency of 
the EU for the second half of the year. The chairmanship of the G8 provided 
the government with the opportunity to further two of its long‐standing 
foreign policy ambitions: to focus attention on mitigating climate change and 
to focus on the lack of African economic development. The government 
sought to use the G8 presidency as the locus for the mobilisation of publics 
within and without the UK to support these issues by its active 
encouragement of the Make Poverty History campaign and the worldwide 
Live 8 concerts, thereby putting pressure on the G8 members to commit to 
substantial poor‐country debt‐relief. 
2005 was a high point of the creative aspects of the Blair‐Brown 
partnership on international policy.1 Brown concentrated for weeks on the 
details of a debt elimination package for the 18 most indebted countries for 
which he gained the approval of the G8 finance ministers at their meeting in 
June in London. Blair appeared to deliver on the leaders of the G8 
committing to fully realise the Millennium Development Goals and gaining 
George W. Bush’s acceptance that climate change required attention with the 
potential for the G8 to play a leading future role. 
The centrepiece of the G8 presidency was the Gleneagles summit held 
from 6‐8 July. Blair’s attendance was interrupted by the London bombings 
that took place on the second day of the summit. The summit could be read as 
a metaphor for New Labour’s foreign policy: its aspirations were for the UK 
to provide active leadership to tackle some of the most intractable global 
development problems, but instead the government’s attention was diverted 
by the ‘war on terror’. 
Brown’s foreign policy doctrine: continuity over change? 
When he became Prime Minister the totality of Gordon Brown’s foreign 
policy aspirations were not entirely clear. As Chancellor of Exchequer Brown 
had sought to define Britain’s foreign economic policy and had established a 
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clear set of positions on development policy and climate change and the 
manner in which international financial institutions should be reformed to fit 
with his interests in dealing with global poverty. This vision for global 
governance could be expressed as the desire for a global new deal through a 
modern Marshall Plan.2 In other areas of foreign policy the assumption was 
that he had not demurred from the major foreign and security policy choices 
made by Blair as this was a not an area of active contestation between the 
government’s two protagonists. Once in office Prime Minister Brown 
broadened the range of foreign policy issues with which he was actively 
engaged and also sought to differentiate the position of his administration 
from that of his predecessor, whilst also maintaining the line that Blair’s major 
foreign policy initiatives had been broadly correct. This position was 
unavoidable, in that as one of the central figures in the New Labour 
government, Brown was complicit in the key foreign policy decisions of 
Blair’s tenure as Prime Minister. Consequently Brown sought to introduce 
nuances into the philosophy underpinning the government’s foreign policy 
alongside the presentational changes that came about through his different 
demeanour from that of his predecessor. 
The first few weeks of the Brown administration did, however, appear 
to represent a change in tone and emphasis. This was most notable in the shift 
from an emphasis on the ‘war on terror’ to a more careful and nuanced choice 
of language. Furthermore, Brown’s first meeting with President Bush at Camp 
David on 27 June 2007 was marked not by the protestations of the importance 
of the transatlantic relationship (which he made) but rather by the careful 
attention that was given to stressing the intention to make the Brown‐Bush 
relationship businesslike, rather than the intimate understanding between 
Blair and Bush. 
Transatlanticism was as central for Brown as it was for Blair, but the 
difference was that for the new Prime Minister there was a clear grand 
strategy: to harness U.S. power and influence to his ambition to restore and 
renew the institutions of global governance to allow for a more effective 
management of global capitalism which would drive the development of the 
poorest economies.3 The expectation was that President Obama would be a 
willing partner in this agenda. The Brown government showed the same 
neurotic preoccupation with the health of the transatlantic relationship as all 
of Britain’s post‐World War II administrations. The change of President from 
Bush to Obama was viewed as an opportunity to renew the partnership after 
the public unpopularity of the Bush‐Blair relationship. From the onset of the 
Obama administration close attention was given to how the UK ranked in the 
relative pecking order of European states. Brown’s position as the first 
European leader to travel to the White House and his invitation to address a 
joint session of Congress, acted to sooth initial anxieties. 
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A key challenge confronting Brown was to restore the reputational 
damage caused by Iraq war which was suffered by the UK during the latter 
half of the Blair administration. However, substantive structural changes in 
the direction of UK foreign policy were impossible with the UK locked into its 
existing overseas military commitments and with no major boost envisioned 
for Britain’s wider diplomatic and foreign policy infrastructure. Furthermore, 
Brown continued Blair’s policy of using the European Union to amplify 
Britain’s wider foreign policy objective to remain a globally significant power 
rather than using Europe as the primary vehicle, or conduit, for British 
foreign and security policy. 
As a heavyweight politician with over a decade in government Brown 
already had a well‐defined political philosophy. Furthermore, in a series of 
interviews and speeches whilst still Chancellor in late 2006 and early 2007 
three broad political priorities were stressed, with climate change and security 
(alongside economic reform) reiterated.4 
The importance for the UK in leading the world effort in responding to 
the challenge of climate change was also a recurrent theme in Brown’s pre‐
Prime Ministerial speeches and statements.5 Illustrative of this priority was 
his commissioning of the Stern Report whilst at the Treasury, and his 
welcoming of its conclusions. The 2006 Queen’s Speech also reported that the 
government would be publishing a bill on climate change as part of its policy 
to protect the environment (and, indeed, the 2008 Climate Change Act set 
clear targets for carbon emissions and saw the introduction of the 
independent Climate Change Committee). Brown’s perspective on climate 
change was that it was perceived through the prism of development, 
emphasising the impact that it will have on the world’s poorest countries and 
arguing that the rich countries should put their financial resources at the 
service of the poor. This emphasis on developing countries was also 
highlighted at Brown’s 2006 Labour party leadership coronation conference 
speech, in which he stated: ‘I make this promise: tackling climate change must 
not be the excuse for rich countries to impose a new environmental 
colonialism: sheltering an unsustainable prosperity at the expense of the 
development of the poor.’6 
Brown’s Lord Mayor’s Banquet speech in November 2007 and his 
Kennedy Memorial Lecture in April 2008 were two further attempts early in 
his premiership to outline a distinctive foreign policy philosophy.7 The Lord 
Mayor’s speech was well received and noted both for its strident emphasis on 
the importance of transatlanticism and its warning to Iran on nuclear 
proliferation. Less remarked at the time – but to become of more substantive 
importance subsequently  ‐ was the stress on the need for the reform and 
renewal of UN, G8, World Bank and the IMF. The Kennedy Memorial Lecture 
on Foreign Policy struck a different note as it was delivered as the credit 
crunch was unfolding and focused on the need to create new rules and 
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institutions for the new global political economy.8 Climate change and the 
need to deal with failed and rogue states were the other two main strands of 
the speech. The speech knits its three strands together through a central 
theme of the need for reform and renewal of the arrangements of global 
governance. 
The publication of the British Government’s first national security 
strategy in March 2008 was Brown’s attempt to map the full spectrum of 
threats to UK security and the appropriate policy responses.9 The document 
attempted to chart a distinctive approach to security and counter‐terrorism in 
the post‐September 11 context. The security strategy reinforced the linkage 
between domestic and international threats to national security and most 
especially in the area of terrorism. It was updated a year later with stress put 
on the results achieved since the preceding year and a greater emphasis on 
the need to counter the domestic terrorist threat with its origins in 
Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan.10 
Changes at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
The hallmark of Blair’s premiership was the creation of a foreign policy 
making process that drained direction and authority for foreign policy away 
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.11 The strengthening of the role 
of the Prime Minister in foreign policy making had been identified under 
previous prime ministers. However, Blair took this approach to a new level, 
with Downing Street driving key bilateral relationships. This was marked not 
just in UK‐US relations but also in the ‘promiscuous bilateralism’ pursued 
with continental European states.12 
Across the period of the New Labour government the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was seen to lose, in terms of influence and budget, to 
the Department for International Development (DFID). This was the 
Chancellor of Exchequer using his powers of resource allocation to see his 
conception of the appropriate foreign policy aspirations for the UK realised.13 
Blair’s long‐standing foreign secretary Jack Straw, who had provided 
the Prime Minister with the political support of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office for the decision to go to war in Iraq, was moved by 
Blair as part of his cabinet reshuffle after the local government elections in 
2006. Straw’s replacement by Margaret Beckett was met with a mixed reaction. 
The initial reaction was of the unexpected nature of her appointment and 
interest as the first female Foreign Secretary, and only the second women 
(after Margaret Thatcher) to hold one of the great offices of state.14 Put this 
within the other endnotes For the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, bruised 
by its divisions over the war with Iraq, there was a guarded welcome to the 
appointment 
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Beckett’s appointment as foreign secretary offered the possibility of 
refocusing public and media attention away from Iraq. However, Beckett had 
a short honeymoon period with the media, which grew much more hostile as 
her tenure progressed, particularly over the UK response to the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in July 2006 and the perceived lack of UK pressure upon 
Israel to end hostilities. The failure of the Prime Minister to respond to 
requests from Beckett to argue more forcefully with the United States for an 
Israeli ceasefire caused divisions with the Cabinet. 
Beckett’s successor as Foreign Secretary was one of the more eye 
catching aspects of Brown’s cabinet reshuffle on 28 June 2007. The 
appointment of David Miliband as Foreign Secretary introduced a dynamism 
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office through his attempts to alter the 
terms of debate on British foreign policy, which were redolent of Robin 
Cook’s early period as Foreign Secretary. 
Miliband sought to re‐focus the main priorities of the Foreign Office 
and to reinvigorate the UK’s foreign policy by making a case for new thinking 
about the UK’s position in international relations and asserting the need for 
the UK to be an active internationalist. Miliband set out a New Strategic 
Framework from which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to order 
the priorities of its operation. 15 Furthermore, he introduced the notion of 
‘Bringing Foreign Policy Home’ by initiating a programme whereby the FCO 
gave greater attention to explaining the UK’s foreign policy within Britain. 
Miliband used speeches to set out a post‐Blair foreign policy and positioned 
himself as ‘big thinker’ on contemporary international relations. Notable was 
his attempt to re‐establish the basis by which the UK should intervene in third 
countries. This was advanced in a lecture delivered in Oxford in February 
2008 entitled ‘The Democratic Imperative’ in which he made the case of a 
continuing moral imperative to intervene to help spread democracy. 16 
Miliband did not, however, enjoy complete latitude to reconceptualise British 
foreign policy single‐handedly. Gordon Brown’s intervention to force last 
minute changes to a speech on the European Union in November 2007 was an 
indication that the Foreign Secretary’s revisionism had its limits.17 
Foreign policy: issues and events 
A hallmark of Blair’s tenure as Prime Minister was the extent to which 
to it became consumed by foreign policy issues – and particularly by the issue 
of the use of armed force by the UK overseas. Of the five wars to which the 
New Labour government committed during its period in power two of these 
were still being waged when it was re‐elected in 2005. The retreat from Iraq 
and the deepening of the UK’s commitments in Afghanistan were the two 
major foreign policy preoccupations for the government between 2005 and 
2010. There is a clear distinction between these two conflicts in that the 
6 

military involvement was pursued in Afghanistan on the basis of a cross 
party support in contrast to party political divisions on Iraq. 
Iraq 
The UK’s role in Iraq underwent a transformation in the course of the 
Parliamentary term. UK combat operations (under the auspices of Operation 
Telic since the invasion in 2003) were declared completed on 30 April 2009 
and all combat troops were withdrawn from the country by the deadline of 31 
July agreed by the British and Iraqi governments. One hundred and seventy 
eight service personnel were killed during the deployment. 
A precise timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq was resisted 
by the government in the early days of the Parliament. Elections in Iraq in 
January and December in 2005 paved the way for the formation of an Iraq 
government in March 2006 and the progressive handing over of responsibility 
for security to the Iraq army. During 2006 and 2007 the areas of the south east 
of the country, for which the UK had responsibility since the invasion in its 
role as head of the Multi‐National Division (South East), were handed over to 
Iraqi control. By the time of the change of Prime Minister in May 2007 British 
troops had been reduced to a contingent of 5,500. The government was 
reluctant to describe the force redeployments as withdrawals but when the 
Four Rifles Battle Group withdrew to Basra Airport from their base in Basra 
City on 2nd September the local population viewed this as a victory for the 
Madhi Army militias based in the city.18 In the summer months of 2008 the 
four remaining provinces for which the UK had responsibility for security 
were handed over to Iraq forces and Basra airport came under Iraqi control on 
1 January 2009 and following the expiry of UNSCR 1790 the continuing 
presence of UK troops was on the basis of bilateral agreements with the Iraq 
government. The UK retains a residual military presence in Iraq on the basis 
of the bilateral defence Training and Maritime Support Agreement with the 
Government of Iraq on 6 June 2009, under which UK forces train the Iraqi 
Navy and Royal Navy have a role protecting Iraqʹs offshore oil platforms. 
The rather ignominious final stages of the UK’s military deployment in 
Iraq ensured that Iraq remained an issue of active political controversy 
beyond the original decision to go to war. As indicated above the Brown 
government was keen to develop a new foreign policy narrative, but the 
ongoing security situation in Iraq and the political instability of the country 
(even though the humanitarian situation improved) created an ongoing and 
uncomfortable reminder of the foreign policy controversy of the Blair era. 
The Iraq Inquiry (often referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry after its 
chairman Sir John Chilcot) announced by Brown in a statement to Parliament 
on 15 June 2009 was an attempt to satisfy public and media desire for a 
political catharsis on the decision to go to war in Iraq. Brown was quickly 
forced to go back on his original announcement that Inquiry proceedings 
7 

would take place in private, following heavy Parliamentary and media 
criticism. The composition of the Inquiry, a committee of Privy Counsellors 
established by the Prime Minister under the agreement of the House of 
Commons, offered an opportunity to remove the Iraq war from Parliamentary 
politics in the run up to the General Election. The remit of the Inquiry was 
broad, covering the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009 
and so encompassing the run‐up to the conflict, the military campaign, and its 
aftermath.19 
Brown’s appeared before the Inquiry on 5 March 2010 for four hours of 
testimony. Following the earlier appearance by Blair on 29 January, the public 
appearance reinforced the impression that the war was inextricably linked 
with the successive Prime Ministers. Brown was trenchant in his support for 
the decision to go to war. There was controversy over Brown’s evidence on 
the financing of the war, and his assertion that all the necessary financial 
resources had been provided to conduct the war contradicted the evidence of 
earlier witnesses, including Sir Kevin Tebbit, the former Permanent Secretary 
at the MoD. Brown wrote to the Inquiry following his appearance to correct 
what were construed as misleading statements in his oral evidence on levels 
of defence expenditure. 
Afghanistan 
Although the deepening of the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan did 
not initially create the same degree of political controversy for the 
government as the Iraq war it has become an issue of active political debate 
and public disquiet throughout the course of the Parliament. 
Over the last five years the security situation in the country has 
remained precarious, with the Taliban apparently not being weakened as a 
military opponent and showing a remarkable ability for tactical and strategic 
adaptation. The re‐election of President Karzai in the Presidential election in 
the autumn of 2009 through a flawed and corrupt process put the UK 
government in a difficult position in which it appeared to be sustaining a 
corrupt regime incapable of reforming itself and developing the country. This 
was despite the UK increasing its modest troop deployment in the country to 
the most sustained military engagement since the Korean War of the 1950s.20 
The lack of substantive political and economic progress in Afghanistan 
during the period in which the UK has increased its military involvement has 
increased the public unpopularity of the UK’s participation, especially in the 
course of 2009.21 By late 2009 polling was consistently recording substantial 
majorities in favour of a UK military withdrawal. 
The decision to redirect the UK’s major overseas military commitment 
from Iraq to Afghanistan served a number of domestic and foreign policy 
purposes for the government. It allowed the establishment of a much clearer 
link between the terrorist threat faced by the UK and the actions of the UK 
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military. It also allowed the UK to compensate for the military withdrawal 
from Iraq by bolstering the U.S.‐led NATO military mission in Afghanistan. 
However, the government has faced criticism not only for its 
resourcing of the military commitment (outlined below) but also because the 
political and security situation in Afghanistan appeared to fluctuate rather 
than improve. Rising casualty figures acted as grim measure of the difficulty 
environment in which British forces were operating. British casualties 
increased from a total of five personnel killed between 2001 and 2005, 
climbing year‐on‐year to a total of two hundred and eight four by the date of 
the General Election in 2010. No end date for the campaign has yet been set. 
The UK’s involvement in Afghanistan went through a key change in 
April 2006 with the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operation into southern Afghanistan and the redeployment of a 
substantially increased British troop presence in Afghanistan to assume 
responsibility for the security of Helmand Province. Helmand was considered 
to be a lawless territory and the main location of Afghanistan’s opium 
production but had not been the location of major fighting since the fall of the 
Taleban. The British involvement in the province is on the basis of a cross‐
Departmental plan devised by the MoD, DFID and the FCO to improve living 
conditions and governance in an area around the provincial capital Lashkar 
Gar designated as an Afghan Development Zone. 
The British military presence is to provide the secure environment 
within which the work would take place. Commentators are divided on 
whether the rising British casualties demonstrate that these tactics and 
strategy are correct and if sufficient resources have been made available for 
the campaign 22 Politically, the government’s handling of the war in 
Afghanistan was not assisted by a ministerial revolving door at the Ministry 
of Defence with four different Secretaries of State during the Parliamentary 
term (John Reid, Des Browne, John Hutton and Bob Ainsworth). Des Browne 
was subject to particular criticism as a ‘part‐time’ Secretary of State for 
Defence as he combined his role with that of Secretary of State for Scotland 
under Gordon Brown from June 2007. 
The Middle East 
The Middle East created additional problems for the government during 
2005‐2010. Prime Minister Blair’s handling of the Israeli military assault on 
Lebanon in July‐August 2006 caused divisions within the cabinet (noted 
above) and did nothing for the UK’s standing with the Arab countries of the 
Middle East. 
David Miliband did attempt a ‘reset’ on the UK’s relations with the 
Arab world after the Iraq war and the UK’s response to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. However, this was complicated by Hamasʹs takeover of Gaza in 
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June 2007 and the subsequent Israeli military offensive in Gaza in the winter 
of 2008‐2009. Britain, alongside other EU member states, followed the U.S. 
policy of seeking to isolate Hamas by withholding recognition and seeking to 
bolster the position of Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank. 
The UK’s contribution to the diplomacy on the Middle East peace 
process was pursued at one remove, through the EU’s membership of the 
Quartet. However, in the absence of any serious peace initiative for the 
Middle East the situation remained largely unchanged during the course of 
the Parliament. The Quartet’s appointment of Tony Blair as its envoy in June 
2007, only hours after he stood down as Prime Minister, was something of a 
mixed blessing for Britain’s profile in region in that it secured a high profile 
position for the UK but through a figure attracting divided views in the 
Middle East. 
Britain’s bilateral relations with states in the wider Middle East were 
also complicated by a series of political controversies. UK‐Iranian bilateral 
relations, already poor because of accusations that Iran was supplying the 
material for improvised explosive devices being used against British troops in 
Iraq, were further complicated by the seizure and detention of 15 British 
sailors for twelve days in the waters off Iran in March‐April 2007. Sections of 
the British media described the detained Royal Navy personnel as ‘hostages’ 
and accusations and counter‐accusations were traded between Britain and 
Iran. The detainees were publicly released by President Ahmadinejad with 
live television coverage. Domestic controversy was stoked by the decision by 
the MoD to allow the detainees to sell their stories to UK newspapers; a move 
which was strongly criticised in Parliament, although the government’s 
diplomatic handling of the crisis was spared substantive criticism.23 
However, the biggest expected foreign policy crisis in the Middle East 
did not occur. Iran’s continuing nuclear enrichment activity, and the 
international diplomacy intended to halt the process, continued throughout 
the Blair‐Brown period. The prospect of the use of military force against Iran 
either by Israel or by the US was a frequently mooted prospect. Being 
challenged to contribute to political or military support for any such 
undertaking would have generated a domestic political controversy close on 
the heels of the Iraq controversy. The UK remained actively involved in a 
search for a diplomatic solution alongside France and Germany as a member 
of the EU3 diplomatic dialogue with Iraq, and through its membership of the 
UN Security Council. 
Russia 
The UK’s most difficult bilateral relationship between 2005 and 2010 
was with Russia. Russia’s new foreign policy assertiveness under President 
Putin, buoyed by rising oil and gas prices, made for deteriorating relations 
between the West and Russia in general. East‐West relations took an event 
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deeper downturn following the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 
August 2008. The UK’s response to these events was largely coordinated 
through the EU which sought to mediate in the conflict through the French 
Presidency. For the UK this was further evidence of the unpredictability of the 
Russian government which the UK had already experienced through the 
harassment of the British Council’s staff in Russia and the demand for it to 
close its offices outside Moscow. 
The UK had already been the subject of continuing criticism from 
Russia as a favoured destination for Russian exiles and for its unwillingness 
to meet requests for extradition of business figures such as Boris Berezovsky. 
Matters came to a head with the poisoning of a British citizen Alexander 
Litvinenko by the radioactive substance Polonium 210. Enquires revealed that 
this was most likely administered during a meeting at a London hotel with a 
Russian Parliamentarian Andrei Lugovi whom the Russian government 
refused to extradite to allow for questioning. In July 2007 David Miliband 
announced the expulsion of four Russian diplomats from the Federation’s 
London embassy. 
Defence expenditure and the Strategic Defence Review 
Political controversy over levels of UK defence expenditure, and more 
particularly the distribution of resources, were a major theme of the 2005‐2010 
government. Recurrent stories in the media about under‐resourced British 
troops in Afghanistan, given an extra poignancy by losses of life being 
attributed to shortages of appropriate personnel protection equipment and 
suitable blast resistant troop transportation, and an inadequate supply of 
helicopters in‐theatre were a recurrent theme. Despite the government’s 
attempts to hasten procurement and to supply additional financial resources 
it found it difficult to persuade the media that it had given these issues 
appropriate priority. 
The final stages of the 2005‐2010 Parliament were marked by a 
consensus between the three political parties on the need to hold a Strategic 
Defence Review – the first since 1998. It was notable that none of the parties 
gave a commitment in their General Election manifestos to preserve defence 
expenditure at its current level of £40bn. On the overseas aid budget – the 
second largest aspect of Britain’s foreign and security expenditure – all three 
main political parties backed the target of raising expenditure to 0.7% of GDP 
by 2013 from its current level of 0.4% 
In the context of the global financial crisis, and with the UK facing a 
budget deficit of £170bn, or 11 per cent of national income, the review will 
take on a different complexion. Reductions in defence expenditure will be a 
crucial consideration in determining foreign policy priorities and the manner 
in which the UK is able to address security threats. Large procurement 
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programmes that were initiated under New Labour ‐ and that include orders 
for aircraft carriers, future tranches of the Eurofighter advanced European 
interceptor aircraft and the US Joint Strike Fighter ‐ are all identified as areas 
of cuts by the three main parties. 
One of Blair’s final actions as Prime Minister impacting on UK defence 
was to seek approval by the House of Commons for the decision to renew 
Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent by initiating the process of planning and 
procurement for the Trident nuclear missile system. The Common’s six hour 
debate and vote on 14 March 2007 was notable as the first occasion on which 
Parliament had been given the opportunity to consider whether the UK 
should remain a nuclear power. The Government secured a majority, but only 
with Conservative Party support, as eighty eight Labour MPs rebelled and 
with former Ministers and Cabinet Ministers among the rebels. 
Foreign policy in the General Election Campaign 
Foreign policy was not a significant feature in the General Election campaign 
as the articles on the parties campaigns illustrate in this issue. The most 
concentrated focus on foreign affairs within the campaign came in the second 
of three televised leaders debates held on 22 April which had an agreed 
theme of international affairs for its first half. 
Three foreign policy questions (four if you include a question on the 
Pope’s visit to the UK) were posed by the audience. The first of the questions 
focused on Europe. The second asked the three leaders if they would 
participate in another multinational operation in a failed state to remove Al 
Qaeda or another terrorist threat. Brown and Clegg’s answers were an 
unequivocal ‘yes’. Cameron was much more circumspect and avoided 
directly answering the question. 
During the debate  ‐ and throughout the campaign  ‐ each of the three 
main party leaders made ritualistic tributes to British troops engaged in 
military operations in Afghanistan but none of the parties indicated their 
view as to the duration of the commitment of forces. Both Clegg and 
Cameron criticised the government for its strategy and for the lack of 
appropriate equipment in Afghanistan. Brown sought to counter these 
criticisms by seeking to demonstrate that he was fully on top of a situation 
which had required an evolving set of responses and different types of 
resources. Clegg sought to cast the debate on resources more widely by 
pointing to weapons systems such as Eurofighter and the Trident system as a 
waste of financial resources. The issue of Trident made for the most heated 
exchanges in the televised debate, with Brown and Cameron heavily 
criticising Clegg for what they presented as a nuclear disarmament of the UK 
(when Clegg’s argument was that the decision to renew Trident did not need 
to be taken now). The third question focused on climate change and provided 
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the three party leaders with the opportunity to introduce issues of energy 
security and to highlight the parties’ differences on nuclear power. 
A striking characteristic of the debate was that none of the leaders 
sought to establish a distinctive foreign policy philosophy, or to offer a 
coherent vision as to how they saw the UK located within changing 
international relations, and especially how to respond to the rise of the BRICs. 
Another televised debate on foreign affairs was held as the first of a series of 
five debates between prospective Cabinet Ministers on the BBC programme 
The Daily Politics. This debate was much more low‐key and much less 
publicly reported in the media. 
The main parties’ manifesto commitments to foreign and security 
policy were marked by their similarities rather than their differences. For 
Labour this was covered in a chapter entitled ‘A Global Future’, for the 
Conservatives ‘Protect our national interest’ and for the Liberal Democrats 
‘Your world’. Each party stressed difficulty of separating domestic from 
international security. Each committed to seeing through the planned 
Strategic Defence Review. Each also maintained that Britain has a special 
responsibility to play an active international role and, in differing terms, that 
the UK is able to punch above its weight. Areas of difference were to be found 
on European policy and on the appropriate priorities for the defence budget. 
The Liberal Democrats manifesto was noticeable for its careful wording on 
Trident: “We will strive for global nuclear disarmament, showing leadership 
by committing not to replace the Trident nuclear weapons system on a like‐
for‐like basis.” 
The Labour manifesto was marked by its differences from its 
predecessors under the leadership of Tony Blair. In the 2010 manifesto there is 
less stress on an active and assertive interventionism and much more of a 
focus on other instruments of British foreign policy such as aid, and an 
interest in conflict prevention through diplomatic means. There are clear 
echoes of the same position from the Conservative Party with recognition of 
the contribution that the UK can make to international relations – but within 
clear limits. One distinctive aspect of the Conservative Party’s manifesto 
commitments was the creation of a National Security Council. This had been 
flagged up well in advance of the election, and criticised on the grounds that 
it is about process rather than the ends of British foreign policy (‘Showing the 
Flag’ The Economist, April 10th 2010 p.18). 
Conclusion 
The General Election campaign was marked by the low‐key nature of 
the debate on foreign, security and defence policy. There was minor 
skirmishing on the resourcing of Britain’s military involvement in 
Afghanistan rather than the substantive question of whether an ongoing 
military commitment is in the country’s best interests. The only marked 
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disparity between the parties was on the issue of the replacement of the 
Trident missile system and on which the Liberal Democrats did not place 
much emphasis in their election campaign. The other area of substantive 
foreign policy difference between the parties was on the relationship with the 
European Union (and covered by another article in this issue) but none of the 
parties sought to devote substantial attention to contrasting their differences 
on Europe. 
With Britain’s post‐election foreign and defence ambitions being so 
heavily conditioned by an environment of constrained public expenditure, the 
lack of proposals for new directions in foreign policy by the three main 
parties was perhaps surprising. Each of the parties has recognised that the UK 
is now operating within a rapidly changing global context which has 
significant implications for the UK’s future security and prosperity. None of 
the parties sought to convey how this might be addressed in a manner that 
was cogent and comprehensible to the electorate. 
On the basis of the debate within the election campaign the incoming 
coalition government might be expected to demonstrate a high degree of 
continuity in foreign policy. However, a key aspect of the early stages of the 
new administration will be to follow through on the commitment to appraise 
Britain’s foreign and security priorities through the Security and Defence 
Review, and this looks set to be a major political preoccupation during the 
early stages of the new Parliament. 
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